DIS

Sep 21, 2010 -
Rogues in a 'rogue state'?
By Yong Kwon

It has been more than five months since the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in which 46 sailors died, yet the incident continues to drag on without resolution.

While an international investigation supported Seoul's conclusion that a North Korean miniature submarine torpedoed the Cheonan, opinion polls reported that nearly 30% of South Koreans did not trust their government's findings. Further complicating the debate, the investigation reports from Russia exempted North Korea from an immediate guilty verdict. Shrouded in ambiguity and military secrecy, it is unlikely that the whole story will be revealed in the near future.

The sinking of the Cheonan marks a significant crossroad in



recent South-North Korean relations. Despite the general lack of knowledge regarding motive and other specifics, the incident will continue to influence the military and diplomatic framework in Northeast Asia for years to come. Therefore, it is paramount to assess the Cheonan sinking without limiting oneself to the tip of the iceberg and remaining open to other possibilities.

Currently, the public discourse seems to only recognize two possible revelations: either Pyongyang ordered the sinking of the Cheonan or Seoul (in liaison with the United States) is covering up its own mistakes and abusing North Korea's international "rogue state" reputation. Locking analyses within these two possibilities disables creative diplomatic solutions towards dealing with North Korea.

In Stanley Kubrick's 1964 cult classic Dr Strangelove, a paranoid American general (who blames communism for his impotence) unilaterally launches a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Unprepared to escalate the situation into a nuclear apocalypse, the US cooperates with the USSR to stop the bombers from reaching their targets. The plot of the film rests on developing the element of individual volition in the lethal calculus of nuclear strategy - an issue not often discussed in Cold War history.

Analysts tend to prematurely eliminate individual actions when analyzing North Korea because of preconceived notions based on the nature of the North Korean military-political organ. However, how accurate is this perception and how would Pyongyang respond to an individual rogue incident if it threatened to trigger an international crisis during economically strenuous times?

In The Cleanest Race, Brian Reynolds Myers recounts several revealing anecdotes of Pyongyang's ideological promotion of spontaneous military action. In the 1961 North Korean movie The Youths of the SS Seagull (Galmaegiho Cheongnyeondeul) a rebellious and independent-spirited protagonist disobeys his superiors for the good of his crewmates (and presumably the larger collective of the Korean people) and is lauded for his spontaneous actions. [1]

In an infamous incident in March of 1965, a mob of North Koreans attacked the Cuban ambassador and his family who were touring Pyongyang. The crowd was clearly motivated by racism, a prejudice that was incompatible with communist ideology. The incident invoked severe criticism from other communist states, but resulted in no changes in Pyongyang's official support for instinctive defense of the Korean "race".

Myers argues that the predominant theme in North Korean propaganda has been to promote a "childlike" race that acts on instinct to defend the purity of his race. There is no doubt that many rogue military actions, like the attempted assassination of former president of South Korea Park Chung-hee by North Korea special forces on January 21, 1968, required Pyongyang's organization and direction.

However, it is less clear whether the "Panmunjom axe killings" of two American soldiers in the demilitarized zone in 1976, the marauding of civilian farms by the Korean People's Army during the famine of the 1990s, or the shooting of a South Korean tourist in 2008 were sanctioned by Pyongyang. More likely than not, these were spillover effects from a prolonged propaganda campaign that supported instinctive and spontaneous action.

So what are the implications of a military force and a militarized society acting instinctively and spontaneously?

First, this advances new theories on Pyongyang's foreign policy direction in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident. If a North Korean miniature submarine had indeed spontaneously attacked the Cheonan, Pyongyang would not be able to claim responsibility for the sinking because it stands insufficiently prepared to absorb the harsh diplomatic and economic consequences.

The sinking of the South Korean corvette occurred during North Korea's recovery from botched currency reform. Additional international economic sanctions could have been lethal to the country.

At the same time, Pyongyang cannot condemn the attack because it would run counter to its political and military propaganda (not to mention admitting sympathy towards its existential foe, South Korea). Pyongyang cannot admit to individual rogue acts of spontaneous violence because it would reveal indecent loss of control in its own military to the international community. If this hypothesis is true, then Pyongyang's situation is even more precarious than often perceived by analysts.

Second, the very concept of the North Korean military and society acting independently from Pyongyang challenges the established US and South Korea foreign policy convention towards North Korea. Policies towards Pyongyang will have to incorporate the possibility of the military and society acting aggressively and violently, even after the Kim dynasty collapses or the Korean Workers' Party commits political suicide.

The US has been spoiled by the relatively clean demolition of its rivals during World War II and the Cold War. Both Japan and Germany surrendered unconditionally and there was no protracted guerilla warfare on either Japanese or German home territories. The Soviet Union's collapse could have initiated a vast intercontinental bloodletting involving nuclear weapons, but it did not.

The hypothetical collapse of North Korea may be a more challenging scenario for all actors in Northeast Asia. With Kim Jong-il not expected to survive long into the next decade and the economy facing severe food scarcity, the desperation of the North Korean people and the Korean People's Army may supersede the state's ability to control and manage the country. What would spontaneous and instinctive actions of the Korean People's Army look like without the Korean Workers' Party and political organs to manage this giant institution?

The sinking of the Cheonan set the diplomatic tone and military attitudes for Northeast Asia in the post-Kim Jong-il era. Regardless of who succeeds the Dear Leader, the new leader of North Korea will be subordinate to the regional conditions set before him. Therefore, it is essential that regional powers leave enough room for unexpected revelations and sudden developments arising from the Cheonan incident.

Studying and analyzing North Korea is a challenging feat because it is largely a step into the unknown. Accepting this basic fact, it would be wrong for analysts or politicians to presume anything.

Note
1. Myers, B R The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters. New York: First Melville House Printing, 2009, pgs 84-85.

Yong Kwon is a Washington-based analyst of international affairs.

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